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Abstract
This paper explains a currency crisis as an outcome of a switch in how monetary
policy and fiscal policy are coordinated. The paper develops a model of an open economy
in which monetary policy starts active, fiscal policy starts passive and, in a particular
state of nature, monetary policy switches to passive and fiscal policy switches to active.
The probability of the regime switch is endogenous and changes over time together
with the state of the economy. The regime switch is preceded by a sharp increase in
interest rates and causes a jump in the exchange rate. The model predicts that currency
composition of public debt affects dynamics of macroeconomic variables. Furthermore,
the model is consistent with evidence from recent currency crises, in particular small
seigniorage revenues.
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1 Introduction
It is common to specify macroeconomic policy in terms of one of two polar regimes and study
what each regime implies for dynamics of macroeconomic variables. In one regime monetary
policy obeys the Taylor (1993) principle and the budget surplus rises strongly with real value
of public debt. In the other regime the Taylor principle fails to hold and the budget surplus
follows an exogenous stochastic process. Leeper (1991) calls the former regime the active
monetary passive fiscal regime. He calls the latter regime the passive monetary active fiscal
regime. The former regime is consistent with standard monetarist intuition and is a plausible
description of how monetary policy and fiscal policy are coordinated in “normal times” in
most economies. The latter regime gives rise to the “fiscal theory of the price level”1 and is
a plausible description of how monetary policy and fiscal policy are coordinated at a time of
a fiscal emergency. For example, Woodford (2001) interprets the policy coordination in the
Unites States during and immediately after World War II in terms of the passive monetary
active fiscal regime.
Almost all papers thus far study either one regime or the other. But if both regimes
can occur in the real world, it is worthwhile to develop models in which both regimes do
occur. This paper develops a model of an open economy in which policy starts out in the
active monetary passive fiscal regime and, at a time of a fiscal emergency, policy switches
to the passive monetary active fiscal regime. A fiscal emergency is a state of nature such
that expected future primary budget surpluses reach an upper bound due to a political
constraint. The model considers a particular form of active monetary policy — a fixed
exchange rate policy. The reason for the focus on this particular form of active monetary
policy is that the model aims to explain the dynamics of collapse of a fixed exchange rate
policy. The regime switch in the model causes a jump in the exchange rate — a currency
crisis. The dynamics prior to the regime switch involve a sharp increase in interest rates
like what we see in the real world during a speculative attack against a fixed exchange rate.
A speculative attack in the model is caused by private agents’ expectations of an imminent
switch in how monetary policy and fiscal policy are coordinated.
The “first generation” model developed by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber
1See Sims (1994) and Woodford (1995).
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(1984) is a standard explanation of why a currency crisis occurs. That model assumes a
constant monetary policy that expands domestic credit at a given rate both before and
after a currency crisis. In contrast, in the model in this paper a currency crisis arises as an
outcome of a switch in how monetary policy and fiscal policy are coordinated. Furthermore,
the first generation model predicts that, after a currency crisis of large size, we will see large
seigniorage revenues. This prediction is difficult to reconcile with recent episodes. Table
1 lists stylized facts about the currency crises in Mexico (1994), Korea (1997) and Turkey
(2001). Each episode was associated with a large currency crisis and a large fiscal imbalance,
but in each episode seigniorage revenues were small relative to the fiscal imbalance. The
model in this paper predicts that the magnitude of a currency crisis will be large precisely
when expected seigniorage revenues are small. In addition, the model predicts that, if the
fiscal imbalance net of expected seigniorage revenues is large, we will see large fiscal gains
due to a decrease in the real value of public debt and transfer payments. As Table 1 shows,
in each crisis the sum of fiscal gains due to a decrease in the real value of public debt and
fiscal gains due to a decrease in the real value of transfer payments was much larger than
seigniorage revenues.
Furthermore, the paper identifies a condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in the active
monetary passive fiscal regime when there exists a possibility of a switch to the passive
monetary active fiscal regime. There is a unique equilibrium when the government will
undertake sufficient fiscal reform coincident with the regime switch. Otherwise there are
multiple equilibria. In the former case a currency crisis can still occur and, when it does,
it is a unique equilibrium phenomenon. In the latter case a currency crisis can be a self-
fulfilling event. In the real world the extent of fiscal reform varies from episode to episode.
See Table 1. The model suggests how we can infer whether a given currency crisis was a
self-fulfilling phenomenon.
The first generation model has motivated empirical tests of predictability of currency
crises. In contrast, the model in this paper suggests that a speculative attack and a currency
crisis will be sudden and difficult to predict, even when equilibrium is unique. The model
explains why in the real world we do not typically see currency crises preceded by smoothly
rising interest rates or by a prolonged period with high and stable interest rates.
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This paper makes contact with the recent literature on currency crises. Daniel (2001) and
Corsetti and Mac´kowiak (2004) model a currency crisis in the passive monetary active fiscal
regime. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001, 2005) provide a quantitative analysis of
a number of recent episodes. Those papers suppose that a regime switch has already taken
place and ask what happens next. Furthermore, those papers assume perfect foresight. In
contrast, the economy modeled in this paper is stochastic and starts out before a regime
switch has taken place. Modeling the evolution of private agents’ expectations regarding
a regime switch yields predictions concerning macroeconomic dynamics. The paper finds
that macroeconomic variables evolve differently in economies identical except for currency
composition of public debt. The reason is that currency composition of public debt affects
private agents’ expectations regarding the probability and the size of a currency crisis. In
particular, the paper finds that a currency crisis is delayed when a large fraction of public
debt is denominated in a foreign currency. This result suggests why borrowing in a foreign
currency can be attractive to policymakers. Governments in some countries that recently
experienced a currency crisis had borrowed heavily in foreign currencies. See Section 2.
This paper also makes contact with the recent literature on regime switches in macro-
economic policy. Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2005) and Davig and Leeper (2005) develop
models in which macroeconomic policy regime evolves according to a Markov process.2 In
their work the probability of a regime switch is exogenous and constant. In this paper the
probability of a regime switch is endogenous and changes over time together with the state
of the economy. Furthermore, Sims (1997) discusses an example in which policy starts out
in the active monetary passive fiscal regime and switches to the passive monetary active
fiscal regime. Sims notes the possibility of multiplicity of equilibria, but his multiplicity
seems more “benign” than the one found here. Sims’s model contains a differential equa-
tion for public debt with two steady states, an upper one being unstable. If public debt
starts out above the unstable steady state, a regime switch occurs in finite time. In contrast,
in this paper there can be multiple solutions for a given initial amount of public debt. Thus
the same initial conditions can be consistent with either a speculative attack and a regime
2See also Andolfatto and Gomme (2003) who assume that monetary policy evolves according to a Markov
process.
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switch or continuation of the status quo.
The possibility of multiple equilibria plays an important role in the “second generation”
model of currency crises. See, for example, Obstfeld (1994).3 The second generation model
postulates that the government must pay a fixed cost when the fixed exchange rate is
abandoned, for example a political cost. The second generation model makes different
predictions from the model in this paper. The second generation model suggests that
borrowing in a foreign currency can enhance government’s credibility. The model in this
paper suggests that policymakers can see borrowing in a foreign currency as attractive
because it affects the dynamics of the economy, even when policy is perfectly credible.
Furthermore, in the second generation model a currency crisis undermines government’s
credibility and this makes subsequent borrowing harder. In fact, governments in some
countries that recently experienced a currency crisis were soon able to borrow the same
amount and at lower interest rates compared to before the currency crisis. See Section 2.
The model in this paper can match this evidence. There is also a difference in terms of
methodology. While Obstfeld (1994) and the subsequent literature consider stylized two-
period models, this paper develops a fully dynamic stochastic equilibrium model.
Section 2 describes the sequence of events that the paper aims to model. Section 3
sets up a dynamic stochastic model of a small open economy. Section 4 discusses what
one can learn analytically about the model. In Section 5 the model is solved numerically
and simulated. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides details of the numerical solution
procedure used in Section 5. Appendix B lists sources for the data used in Section 2 and in
Section 5.
2 The sequence of events
This section describes the sequence of events that the paper aims to model. The currency
crisis in Brazil in January 1999 serves as an example. Panel A in Figure 1 shows the
expansion of public debt in Brazil in the two years prior to the currency crisis. The expansion
of public debt reflected a “huge imbalance between what Brazilians demand of government
3See also the model of public debt in Calvo (1988).
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and how much they are willing to pay for.”4 Panel B shows that in the run-up to the
currency crisis more and more public debt was indexed to inflation or to the exchange
rate.5 Panel C shows that foreign reserves decreased somewhat but remained close to 100
percent of the monetary base throughout the episode. Two speculative attacks caused two
sharp increases in the short-term nominal interest rate and afterwards a large jump in the
exchange rate took place. The currency lost about 30 percent of its value with respect to
the dollar. The short-term nominal interest rate fell and stabilized soon after the currency
crisis. See Panels D and E. Seigniorage revenues decreased to below pre-crisis levels. See
Panel F. The currency devaluation caused a large decrease in the real value of public debt,
as is apparent from Panel A. Within days of the currency crisis the legislature approved a
package of fiscal reforms, including a controversial decrease in pension benefits. The same
package had been rejected four times when the fixed exchange rate was in place.6 Soon
after the devaluation the government was able to borrow about as much as two years prior
to the crisis. See Panel A.
This suggests the following sequence of events to model. The government adopts a fixed
exchange rate policy, which is a form of active monetary policy.7 Passive fiscal policy is put
in place with the aim of making the fixed exchange rate sustainable. Public debt fluctuates
over time due to shocks to revenues and expenditures. If the exchange rate is to remain
fixed, current adverse fiscal shocks must be matched by improvements in future budgets.
However, citizens want a certain level of public spending and are unwilling to pay taxes
higher than a certain amount. If expected future primary budget surpluses necessary to
keep the exchange rate fixed become too large, the policy regime changes. The regime
switch is preceded by a speculative attack, or by multiple attacks, and coincides with a
jump in the exchange rate. A speculative attack manifests itself by a sharp increase in the
short-term nominal interest rate, not necessarily by a loss of foreign reserves.8 The regime
4“Can Cardoso use financial chaos to reform Brazil?” The Economist, 24th September 1998.
5Foreign currency public debt or foreign currency private debt backed by the government has been a
factor in numerous episodes other than Brazil.
6 “No peace for Brazil’s president.” The Economist, 21st January 1999.
7The exchange rate was not literally fixed in Brazil. The currency was devalued by small amounts
according to a pre-announced schedule.
8Foreign reserves are an important variable in the first-generation model of Krugman (1979) and Flood
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switch occurs at a time of a fiscal emergency, after an unsustainable increase in public debt,
when the government and the citizens recognize the need for inflation tax and some fiscal
reform. At the time of the regime switch the government raises revenues by deflating public
debt and transfer payments denominated in the domestic currency. After the regime switch
monetary policy keeps interest rates on public debt low and stable thereby raising only
small seigniorage revenues. This suggests that fiscal policy is active and monetary policy is
passive.
3 The model
The framework of analysis is a dynamic stochastic model of a small open economy. Consider
a small open economy with a government and many identical private agents who receive a
constant endowment Y of a single consumption good. The domestic price level P and the
foreign price level P ∗ are linked by the law of one price. The model assumes that P ∗ is
constant and normalizes P ∗ to unity. This implies that the exchange rate, defined as the
price of one unit of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency, is equal to P .9
The economy takes exogenously the foreign nominal interest rate which is equal to the real
interest rate.
3.1 Private agents’ optimization problem
Private agents pay lump-sum taxes, hold one-period discount bonds B denominated in the
domestic currency, one-period discount bonds B∗ denominated in the foreign currency and
domestic money M that reduces transactions costs. The model assumes that B and M are
each non-negative, issued by the government and held by private agents in the domestic
economy. Private agents maximize
E
" ∞X
t=0
βt lnCt
#
and Garber (1984). In that model a currency crisis takes place after foreign reserves have been exhausted.
9The model abstracts from the real exchange rate. Corsetti and Mac´kowiak (2005) study dynamics of
the real exchange rate in a model of a currency crisis in the passive monetary active fiscal regime.
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subject to
Bt
RtPt
+
B∗t
ρt
+
Mt
Pt
≤ Bt−1
Pt
+B∗t−1 +
Mt−1
Pt
+ Y − τ t −Ct [1 + γf (Vt)]
in every period. HereRt is the domestic gross nominal interest rate (that is, the inverse of the
price of domestic currency discount bonds), ρt is the foreign gross interest rate (that is, the
inverse of the price of foreign currency discount bonds), τ t denotes the real primary budget
surplus of the government, Ct denotes consumption of the single good, Vt ≡ (CtPt/Mt)
denotes velocity, γf (Vt) represents transactions costs per unit of consumption spending
and γ is a parameter satisfying γ > 0.10 In the model the evolution of the primary budget
surplus τ t is the only source of uncertainty.11
3.2 The government budget constraint
The government budget constraint is
Bt
RtPt
+
Ft
ρt
+
Mt
Pt
=
Bt−1
Pt
+ Ft−1 +
Mt−1
Pt
− τ t, (1)
where Ft denotes one-period foreign currency discount bonds issued by the government.
Equation (1) should be interpreted broadly. In particular, governments have imperfectly
indexed liabilities other than publicly traded bonds and money, for example pension com-
mitments. There is evidence that even small changes in the price level can cause large
changes in real value of such public liabilities.12 Furthermore, debt that was issued by a
private agent but will be repaid by the government is sometimes not reported in official
statistics. In the model there is no difference between public debt and privately issued debt
that will be repaid by the government.
3.3 First order conditions in the private agents’ problem
The first order conditions for a solution of the private agents’ problem are as follows. The
optimal choice of consumption reflects the difference, due to transactions costs, between the
10Feenstra (1986) shows equivalence between using money as an argument of a utility function and entering
money into transactions costs that appear in a budget constraint.
11The specification with stochastic lump-sum taxes and logarithmic utility follows Leeper (1991) and Sims
(1994).
12See Persson, Persson and Svensson (1998).
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marginal utility of consumption and the shadow value of the budget constraint of private
agents λt
C−1t = λt
£
1 + γf (Vt) + γf 0 (Vt)Vt
¤
. (2)
Given that P ∗ is constant and given that the model abstracts from default risk, the first
order condition with respect to B∗ is the same as for pricing a riskless bond
1
ρt
= βEt
µ
λt+1
λt
¶
. (3)
The first order condition with respect to B is
1
Rt
= βEt
µ
λt+1
λt
Pt
Pt+1
¶
. (4)
The first order condition with respect to M includes a term reflecting transactions costs
1− γf 0 (Vt)V 2t = βEt
µ
λt+1
λt
Pt
Pt+1
¶
. (5)
Combining equations (4) and (5) yields a liquidity preference relation
1− γf 0 (Vt)V 2t = R−1t . (6)
How money enters the model is inessential for the results. When one specializes to the
family of bounded f functions, f (Vt) ≡ [Vt/ (1 + Vt)]η, where the parameter η satisfies
η > 0,13 equation (6) becomes
Mt
Pt
=
(·
γη
µ
Rt
Rt − 1
¶¸ 1
1+η
− 1
)
Ct. (7)
The transversality condition is
lim
T→∞
βTE
µ
λT
B∗T
ρT
+ λT
BT
RTPT
+ λT
MT
RTPT
¶
= 0.
Using equations (3), (4) and (5) and the following condition
lim
T→∞
βTE
µ
λT
FT
ρT
+ λT
BT
RTPT
+ λT
MT
RTPT
¶
= 0,
one obtains the solved-forward version of the government budget constraint (1)
Bt−1 +Mt−1
Pt
+ Ft−1 = Et
( ∞X
s=0
βsλt+s
λt
·
τ t+s +
µ
Rt+s − 1
Rt+s
¶
Mt+s
Pt+s
¸)
. (8)
13This specification of the f function generalizes a specification in Sims (1994).
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The real value of public liabilities equals the present discounted value of expected primary
budget surpluses plus the present discounted value of expected seigniorage revenues, where
seigniorage revenues are equal to interest payments avoided by maintaining money balances.
Equation (8) can be used to illustrate the dichotomy of policy regimes due to Leeper
(1991) and popular in the literature. Equation (8) plays a central role in determining the
equilibrium price level in the passive monetary active fiscal regime. Given an exogenous path
of budget surpluses the price level adjusts to satisfy equation (8). In the active monetary
passive fiscal regime other equilibrium relations, equations (4) and (5), play a central role
in determining the equilibrium price level. Equation (8) remains in the background since
passive fiscal policy adjusts budget surpluses to make equation (8) hold.
Furthermore, equation (8) can be used to illustrate the difference between expected
seigniorage revenues and fiscal consequences of unexpected changes in the price level. For
example, it is perfectly possible that the term
³
Rt−1
Rt
´
Mt
Pt is small in every period t so that
expected seigniorage revenues are small and, at the same time, stochastic fluctuations in
the price level cause large fiscal gains and losses. Finally, equation (8) makes it clear why
foreign reserves per se are not an important variable. What matters is how the sum of
all net public liabilities compares with the sum of the present discounted value of primary
budget surpluses and the present discounted value of seigniorage revenues.
Since the interest is in a regime switch that moves the economy far away from an
initial steady state, it is important to obtain a nonlinear solution of the full model without
resorting to approximation around a steady state. In order to keep the solution tractable
it is necessary to abstract from some features that are straightforward to handle in models
solved in approximate form, for example, the dynamics of current account. In the following
attention is restricted to equilibria that arise if ρt is equal to a constant ρ such that ρ = β−1,
λt is equal to a constant λ and B∗t = Ft in every period t. In any such equilibrium uncovered
interest parity holds
β−1 = RtEt
µ
Pt
Pt+1
¶
, (9)
that is, the expected return on domestic currency government bonds matches the inverse of
the discount factor. Equation (9) follows from equation (4) given that λt is equal to λ.
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3.4 The policy regime before a switch
Policy behavior is specified in terms of exogenous policy rules in the model. This is natural
given that the interest is in modeling the behavior of private agents for a given policy
behavior. Exogenous policy rules describe beliefs of private agents concerning what policy
will do, regardless of why policy will do so. However, notice that policy behavior is modeled
in terms of feedback rules that involve endogenous variables. This implies that there will
be interactions between the behavior of private agents and policy variables. Furthermore,
the date of the regime switch is endogenous in the model.14
Suppose the economy starts out in period t = 0 with policy described by



Pt = P¯
τ t = φ0 + φ1
³
Bt−1
P + Ft−1
´
+ ψt, ψt ∼ iidN
¡
0, σ2
¢
, t < T,
(10)
where the parameter φ0 satisfies φ0 < 0 and the parameter φ1 satisfies 1−β < φ1 < 1. Policy
for periods t ≥ T will be given below. The value of T will be determined endogenously.
Fixing the exchange rate P at P¯ is a form of active monetary policy. The restrictions
on φ1 guarantee that the primary budget surplus rises with real value of public debt by
more than enough to offset the increased public debt service. This means that the feedback
rule in expression (10) constitutes passive fiscal policy. A higher value of the parameter
φ1 implies a stronger systematic response of the primary budget surplus to public debt.
The stochastic component of fiscal policy captures effects on revenues and expenditures of
disturbances beyond the control of policymakers, or effects of capricious policy.
Expression (10) implies that in periods t < T the economy is in the active monetary
passive fiscal regime. It is straightforward to show that, if T is set equal to infinity, the
exchange rate Pt will remain at P¯ forever. Passive fiscal policy is critical to this conclusion.
Passive fiscal policy implies that the government will always raise real taxes to pay for
public debt and will never use inflation tax.
14Leeper (1991) and the subsequent literature as well as Krugman (1979) and the subsequent literature
also postulate exogenous policy rules.
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3.5 The policy regime switch rule
The government budget constraint (1) and expression (10) with T set equal to infinity
imply that public debt follows a first-order stationary Gaussian autoregressive process with
an autoregressive coefficient equal to β−1 (1− φ1).15 In this case, the variance of public
debt is equal to the variance of the fiscal shock ψ divided by β2 − (1− φ1)2. This implies
that the variance of public debt can be many times larger than the variance of the fiscal
shock.16 Thus, even when fluctuations in revenues and expenditures are moderate, there
will be states of nature such that large improvements in future primary budget surpluses
will be required to keep the exchange rate fixed. However, if citizens want a certain level of
government spending and are unwilling to pay taxes higher than a certain amount, there will
be an upper bound on future primary budget surpluses. This political constraint implies
that the active monetary passive fiscal regime will not be sustainable in some states of
nature.17
When private agents form expectations, they recognize that the active monetary passive
fiscal regime will not be sustainable in some states of nature. Suppose the government is
expected to change the policy regime in a fiscal emergency, that is, at a time when expected
future primary budget surpluses reach an upper bound. Formally, the government abandons
the regime in expression (10) in period T where T is the first period t in which (10) implies
that
Bt−1
P¯
+ Ft−1 − τ t ≥ D¯. (11)
Thus a regime switch occurs in the first period in which, if policy continued to satisfy
expression (10), the total amount of public debt minus the primary budget surplus would
exceed an upper bound D¯. Observe that D¯ is in effect an upper bound on the expected
15With the exchange rate P fixed at P¯ forever there would be no distinction between domestic currency
public debt B and foreign currency public debt F .
16For example, when φ1 = 0.07 and β = 0.95 the variance of public debt is equal to 25 times the variance
of the fiscal shock ψ.
17Another way to motivate an upper bound on primary budget surpluses is with a feasibility constraint.
Observe that a stationary Gaussian autoregressive process is unbounded. This implies that there will be
states of nature such that the primary budget surplus required to keep the exchange rate fixed will be larger
than real income Y .
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future primary budget surplus, since Et (τ t+1) is a monotonically increasing function of¡
Bt−1/P¯
¢
+ Ft−1 − τ t.18 Thus expression (11) implies that expectations of the future, not
the current level of public debt, trigger a regime switch. This accords well with the idea
that expectations are critical to the dynamics of a currency crisis.
3.6 The policy regime after a switch
In periods t ≥ T monetary policy is passive and fiscal policy is active



Rt = R¯
τ t = τ¯ + ψt = θ0 + θ1RT−1 + ψt, ψt ∼ iidN
¡
0, σ2
¢
, t ≥ T,
(12)
where R¯ ≥ β−1 and the parameter θ0 satisfies θ0 > 0. The Taylor principle fails to hold and
the primary budget surplus follows a stochastic process independent of the level of public
debt in periods t ≥ T .19 Furthermore, the post-switch primary budget surplus τ¯ responds
to the pre-switch interest rate RT−1. This captures a variety of expectations private agents
can have regarding the extent of fiscal reform coincident with the regime switch. Recall
that in the real world the extent of fiscal reform varies from episode to episode. In the
model θ1 > 0 corresponds to fiscal reform, θ1 < 0 corresponds to fiscal slippage and θ1 = 0
is a special case in which there is no feedback between the regime in periods t < T and the
regime in periods t ≥ T .20
3.7 Currency composition of public debt
The effects of currency composition of public debt can be illustrated as follows. Suppose
that the government makes foreign currency public debt a constant fraction κ of the total
18Specifically, expressions (1) and (10) with T set equal to infinity imply that Et (τ t+1) = φ0 +
β−1φ1
£¡
Bt−1/P¯
¢
+ Ft−1 − τ t
¤
.
19 It is possible to include a more general active fiscal rule in the model. A more general active fiscal rule
would allow the primary budget surplus to respond weakly to real value of public debt. That set-up would
yield the same conclusions as the model in this paper calibrated with a higher value of the parameter θ0.
Furthermore, see Corsetti and Mac´kowiak (2004) for the analysis of a more general passive monetary policy
rule. Their specification allows the nominal interest rate to react weakly to the rate of inflation.
20The political economy literature formalizes the idea that crises can be beneficial for fiscal reforms. See
Drazen and Grilli (1993) and Zarazaga (1997).
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amount of public debt
Ft = κ
µ
Bt
Pt
+ Ft
¶
, (13)
where the parameter κ satisfies κ ∈ [0, 1). The effects of changes in the parameter κ,
for a given total amount of public debt and for a given sequence of shocks, are examined
below. Solving the model with different values of κ can be thought of as comparing two
economies identical in every respect except for the currency composition of public debt, or as
investigating the effects of an unanticipated one-time change in the currency composition
of public debt in a single economy. The same interpretation applies to changes in other
parameters of the model.
3.8 Equilibrium
A rational expectations equilibrium in this economy is a specification for the vector
{Ct, Bt,Mt, Ft, τ t, Rt, Pt}∞t=0
such that: (i) {Ct, Bt,Mt, Ft}∞t=0 solves the private agents’ optimization problem in which
private agents take as given {τ t, Rt, Pt}∞t=0 and {Y, ρ,B−1,M−1, F−1}; (ii) the government
chooses {Bt,Mt, Ft, τ t, Rt, Pt}∞t=0 taking as given equation (1), the private agents’ optimality
conditions and {Y, ρ,B−1,M−1, F−1}; (iii) the solved-forward government budget constraint
(8) holds.
4 Analyzing the model
This section analyzes the main mechanisms of the model. In the next section the model is
solved numerically and simulated.
Consider a period t such that t < T , that is, a period in which the active monetary
passive fiscal regime is in place and Pt = P¯ . The government budget constraint (1), the
feedback rule for τ t in expression (10) and the policy rule for determining the currency
composition of public debt (13) imply that
Bt
P¯
=
·
Rt (1− κ)
1− κ+ βκRt
¸ ·
(1− φ1)
µ
Bt−1
P¯
+ Ft−1
¶
− φ0 − ψt −
µ
Mt −Mt−1
P¯
¶¸
, (14)
14
and
Ft =
µ
κRt
1− κ+ βκRt
¶·
(1− φ1)
µ
Bt−1
P¯
+ Ft−1
¶
− φ0 − ψt −
µ
Mt −Mt−1
P¯
¶¸
. (15)
Expressions (14) and (15) imply that when the nominal interest rate Rt rises the total
amount of public debt,
¡
Bt/P¯
¢
+ Ft, increases. The reasons are twofold. A lower price of
domestic currency discount bonds implies that the government must issue a greater quantity
of bonds, other things equal. Furthermore, when Rt increases the demand for real money
balances falls, that is,
³
Mt−Mt−1
P¯
´
< 0. This also implies that the government must issue a
greater quantity of bonds, other things equal. In addition, expressions (14) and (15) imply
that when the value of the parameter κ rises the total amount of public debt decreases, so
long as Rt > ρ.21 If there is a non-zero probability of a currency crisis in period t+1, then
Rt > ρ. See equation (9). The implications are as follows. If the probability of a currency
crisis is zero, the currency composition of public debt does not affect the total amount of
public debt. If the probability of a currency crisis is greater than zero, an increase in the
value of κ implies that the total amount of public debt decreases. Finally, expressions (14)
and (15) imply that a stronger systematic policy response to public debt, i.e. a higher value
of the parameter φ1, decreases public debt for a given value of the shock ψt. Therefore
one can think of the parameter φ1 as a measure of the degree of fiscal reform in the active
monetary passive fiscal regime.
Let qt denote the probability that a regime switch will occur in period t+1, conditional
on information available in period t. Furthermore, define a variable eψt according to
eψt = (1− φ1)µBtP¯ + Ft
¶
− φ0 − D¯,
where one can substitute expression (14) for
¡
Bt/P¯
¢
and one can substitute expression (15)
for Ft. Then the regime switch rule (11) implies that
qt = Pr
³
ψt+1 ≤ eψt | t´ . (16)
Expressions (14)-(16) imply that when the nominal interest rate Rt rises the probability of
the regime switch qt increases. Furthermore, when the value of κ increases and the value of
21A change in the value of κ does not affect the total amount of public debt when Rt = ρ.
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φ1 increases the probability of the regime switch qt falls. The reason is that changes in the
nominal interest rate and changes in the values of the parameters κ and φ1 affect the total
amount of public debt and thereby affect how far the economy is from the point where a
regime switch is triggered.
Next, observe that equation (7) implies that velocity Vt is a monotonic function of the
nominal interest rate Rt
Vt =
(·
γη
µ
Rt
Rt − 1
¶¸ 1
1+η
− 1
)−1
. (17)
Furthermore, equation (2) implies that consumption Ct is a monotonic function of velocity
Ct =
(
λ
"
1 + γ
µ
Vt
1 + Vt
¶η
+ γη
µ
Vt
1 + Vt
¶η−1 Vt
(1 + Vt)2
#)−1
. (18)
Substituting equation (17) into equation (18) yields an expression for consumption Ct as
a function of the nominal interest rate Rt. Consumption varies inversely with the nominal
interest rate in equilibrium, because when the nominal interest rate is high more output
is lost due to transactions costs. Substituting equation (18) into equation (7) yields an
expression for real money balances (Mt/Pt) as a function of the nominal interest rate Rt.
Consider now the period t = T , that is, the period of the regime switch. The exchange
rate in period T , PT , adjusts so that the real value of public liabilities equals the present
discounted value of the sum of expected primary budget surpluses and expected seigniorage
revenues. Specifically, PT adjusts so that equation (8)
BT−1 +MT−1
PT
+ FT−1 = ET
( ∞X
s=0
βs
·
τT+s +
µ
RT+s − 1
RT+s
¶
MT+s
PT+s
¸)
.
holds. It is straightforward to see that the present discounted value of expected seigniorage
revenues depends only on the nominal interest rate in periods t ≥ T , R¯. Simply note
ET
" ∞X
s=0
βs
µ
RT+s − 1
RT+s
¶
MT+s
PT+s
#
= (1− β)−1
µ
R¯− 1
R¯
¶
m
¡
R¯
¢
,
where m
¡
R¯
¢
is a monotonic function mapping the constant nominal interest rate R¯ into a
constant level of real money balances in periods t ≥ T . Defining the variable Ω according
to
Ω
¡
R¯
¢
=
µ
R¯− 1
R¯
¶
m
¡
R¯
¢
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yields the conclusion that the present discounted value of seigniorage revenues is equal to
(1− β)−1Ω and depends only on R¯.
Next, the solved-forward government budget constraint (8) and the policy rule for τ t in
expression (12) imply that
P−1T =
µ
1
BT−1 +MT−1
¶µ
τ¯
1− β + ψT +
Ω
1− β − FT−1
¶
. (19)
Consider a period t such that t < T and let Et
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢
denote the expected value
of P−1t+1 conditional on the regime switch taking place in period t + 1 and conditional on
information available in period t. Then equation (19) implies that
Et
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢
=
µ
1
Bt +Mt
¶µ
τ¯
1− β +
Ω
1− β − Ft
¶
. (20)
Furthermore,
PT =
BT−1 +MT−1³
τ¯
1−β + ψT
´
+ Ω1−β − FT−1
. (21)
In period T the exchange rate adjusts so that equation (21) holds.22 Since period T is a time
of a fiscal emergency, parameter values will be chosen such that the exchange rate jumps
up in period T , that is PT > P¯ . In this case, the regime switch causes a decrease in the
real value of domestic currency government liabilities B and M . Observe that the term in
brackets in the denominator on the right hand side of equation (21) is the present discounted
value of expected primary budget surpluses. Equation (21) shows that the smaller is the
present discounted value of primary budget surpluses, the larger is the jump in the exchange
rate in period T . Furthermore, the smaller is the present discounted value of seigniorage
revenues, the larger is the jump in the exchange rate in period T . Note also that foreign
currency public debt enters with a negative sign in the denominator on the right hand side
of equation (21). This implies that foreign currency public debt acts as leverage. If the
amount of foreign currency public debt is large then the jump in the exchange rate is large,
for given primary budget surpluses and seigniorage revenues.
Finally, uncovered interest parity (9) can be restated as
β−1 = P¯Rt
£
qtEt
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢
+ (1− qt) P¯−1
¤
. (22)
22Equation (21) holds in every period t such that t ≥ T , with the T subscript replaced by the t ≥ T
subscript.
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When the probability of the regime switch qt increases or Et
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢
decreases, the
nominal interest rate Rt must go up. The expected return on domestic currency government
bonds must match the return on foreign currency government bonds. However, observe that
ex post returns on domestic currency government bonds can be different from the return
on foreign currency government bonds. In fact, if the probability of a currency crisis is
greater than zero but a currency crisis does not occur, the ex post return on domestic
currency government bonds will be greater than the return on foreign currency bonds. This
is why domestic currency government bonds are different in the model from foreign currency
government bonds.
Considering the equations displayed in this section helps develop intuition regarding
determinacy of equilibrium in the model. In a period t such that t < T , consider an
economy in which the parameter θ1 satisfies θ1 = 0. Suppose that the nominal interest rate
Rt increases. This makes the total amount of public debt go up. With more public debt
held by private agents the probability of the regime switch increases and the expected size
of the jump in the exchange rate increases. But when the probability of the regime switch
increases and the expected size of the jump in the exchange rate increases, the nominal
interest rate goes up by uncovered interest parity. The dynamic is circular which suggests
that there can exist multiple equilibria. In particular, there can exist an equilibrium in
which the nominal interest rate is low and the probability of a currency crisis is low and
there can exist an equilibrium in which the nominal interest rate is high and the probability
of a currency crisis is high. A currency crisis can be a self-fulfilling event. Next, consider an
economy in which the parameter θ1 is positive and suppose again that the nominal interest
rate Rt increases. This still makes the total amount of public debt go up. However, now
the expected size of the jump in the exchange rate can decrease because the government
is expected to undertake fiscal reform in the event of the regime switch. The circularity is
eliminated.
The model suggests that macroeconomic stability in the active monetary passive fiscal
regime, when there exists a possibility of a switch to the passive monetary active fiscal
regime, depends on expectations about what will happen after the switch. The reasons
are twofold. Since the active monetary passive fiscal regime is not sustainable in all states
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of nature, private agents need to form expectations not only about policy in the current
active monetary passive fiscal regime but also about policy in the case if the current regime
is abandoned. Furthermore, the behavior of private agents can cause interest rates on
public debt to rise and this can take the economy to the brink of a regime switch. Only
policy commitment concerning what will happen after the regime switch can eliminate the
speculative dynamics of public debt as possible equilibria. The subsequent section provides
a detailed numerical analysis of determinacy of equilibrium and other features of the model.
5 Solving and simulating the model
This section discusses numerical solutions of the model for a variety of different parameter
values. The numerical solution procedure consists of the following steps. In the first step
parameter values are chosen and a value for the vector of initial conditions {B−1,M−1, F−1}
is chosen. In the second step N realizations of the stochastic process for {ψt}t=
bT
t=0 are
simulated. In the third step the solution for
©
Ct, Bt,Mt, Ft, τ t, Rt, Pt, qt|t<T , Et|t<T
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢ªt= bT
t=0
is computed and the period of the regime switch T is recorded, for each of the N realiza-
tions of the stochastic process for {ψt}t=
bT
t=0 .
23 The exercise is repeated with the same N
realizations of the stochastic process for {ψt}t=
bT
t=0 and with different parameter values. See
Appendix A for details of the numerical solution procedure.
The presentation of the results is organized around a benchmark economy. Parameter
values for the benchmark economy are motivated by the main features of the currency crisis
in Brazil. Afterwards the effects of changes in the parameter values are examined. The
data indicate that net debt of the federal government in Brazil was between 30 and 40
percent of GDP in the two years prior to the currency crisis and in the two years after the
currency crisis. The data almost certainly understate significantly the true indebtedness of
the public sector in Brazil, since the data do not include non-traded liabilities of the federal
government or liabilities of state governments. Therefore, parameter values are chosen such
23The notation qt|t<T and Et|t<T
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢
indicates that the variables qt and Et
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢
are only defined in periods t < T .
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that public debt in the model, BtPt + Ft, is higher than in the data and fluctuates between
40 and 70 percent of real income. Based on this reasoning, B−1P¯ + F−1 is set equal to
0.45, D¯ is set equal to 0.6, σ is set equal to 0.04, φ0 is set equal to -0.02 and φ1 is set
equal to 0.07. P¯ is set equal to 1. After the amount of public debt in the model has been
chosen, the parameters θ0 and θ1 are set such that the present discounted value of primary
budget surpluses is approximately as large as the amount of public debt. In addition, in
the benchmark economy the parameter θ1 is set such that there is a unique equilibrium.
This reasoning yields θ0 = 0.0135 and θ1 = 0.012. The parameter κ is set equal to 0.5 in
the benchmark economy, which is approximately the value in the data from Brazil until
a few months before the currency crisis.24 The parameter R¯ is set equal to 1.05, which
was approximately the average gross short-term nominal interest rate in the two years
after the currency crisis in Brazil.25 The parameter ρ is also set equal to 1.05, which was
approximately the average gross interest rate on the dollar denominated Brazilian treasury
bill during the two years prior to the currency crisis. The parameters γ and η are chosen
such that the ratio (Mt/PtY ) in the model is approximately the same as the average ratio
of the monetary base to nominal GDP in the data. This yields γ = 1/25 and η = 24.26
5.1 Determinacy of equilibrium
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of the benchmark economy. This figure plots the equilib-
rium values of the variables in the model in period t < T as a function of the initial amount
of public debt, Bt−1P¯ +Ft−1. One can think of the figure as a snapshot of the solution of the
dynamic model in a period in which the active monetary passive fiscal regime is in place.
There is a unique equilibrium. The nominal interest rate Rt, the probability of the regime
switch qt, and the inverse of Et
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢
increase as the initial amount of public debt
rises. Furthermore, the end-of-period amount of public debt, BtP¯ + Ft, increases. In this
particular case, since κ = 0.5, domestic currency public debt is equal to foreign currency
24The value of κ in the data from Brazil increased to about 0.9 in the few months immediately prior to
the currency crisis. See Panel B in Figure 1. The effects of changes in the parameter κ are examined below.
25This assumes that a single period in the model is a quarter.
26 In addition, N is set equal to 250, bT is set equal to 200 and M−1 is set equal to a value implied by the
model given that R−1 = ρ.
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public debt. Finally, money holdings fall and consumption falls as the initial amount of
public debt rises.27
Consider how the behavior of the economy in period t < T changes when the parameter
θ1 decreases. The top row in Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of the economy with θ1 =
0.006, that is, the parameter θ1 decreases by 50 percent relative to the benchmark economy.
The bottom row in Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of the economy with θ1 = 0.001. Both
economies depicted in Figure 3 have a unique equilibrium if the initial amount of public debt
is low and if the initial amount of public debt is high. Furthermore, both economies have
multiple equilibria if the initial amount of public debt is in an intermediate range. In fact,
there are then three equilibria: an equilibrium in which the probability of a currency crisis
qt is approximately zero, an equilibrium in which qt is approximately one and an equilibrium
in which qt is in an intermediate range. As θ1 decreases, the range of the initial conditions
associated with indeterminacy of equilibrium widens. Note that the same initial conditions
can be consistent with either the regime switch with probability one or continuation of the
status quo with probability one. This implies that self-fulfilling beliefs of private agents can
determine whether the regime switch occurs.
It is interesting to ask how an economy with multiple equilibria appears to an outside
observer. In every period t < T one equilibrium outcome is realized. In period t+ 1 either
a regime switch occurs or a regime switch does not occur. In the former case there is a
unique equilibrium outcome from then on. In the latter case there are again multiple equi-
librium outcomes, so long as public debt remains in the range associated with multiplicity
of equilibria.
The results show that a sufficient value of the parameter θ1 guarantees that equilibrium
is unique. When the parameter θ1 is large enough, the expected magnitude of the currency
crisis fails to rise sufficiently in response to a high nominal interest rate for that high nominal
interest rate to be a viable equilibrium. The value of the parameter θ1 can reflect the extent
of explicit fiscal reform undertaken in response to the currency crisis, where explicit fiscal
reform is, for example, the decrease in pension benefits in response to the currency crisis
in Brazil. The value of the parameter θ1 can also reflect the extent of implicit fiscal reform
27 In deriving the solutions depicted in Figures 2-4 the value of ψt is set equal to −σ.
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that occurs in response to the currency crisis without legislative action, for example, the
decreases in the real value of government transfer payments in Korea, Mexico and Turkey.
5.2 Currency composition of public debt
The discussion from this point focuses on parameter values such that there is a unique
equilibrium. Figure 4 illustrates how the behavior of the economy in period t < T changes
when the parameter κ is different than in the benchmark economy. Recall from Section
4 that an increase in the parameter κ has two effects. When the parameter κ rises the
total amount of public debt falls. Therefore the probability of the regime switch decreases
and the nominal interest rate decreases. Furthermore, when the parameter κ rises, the
government’s leverage increases. Therefore the expected size of the jump in the exchange
rate increases, the nominal interest rate increases and the probability of the regime switch
increases. Figure 4 shows the interaction of the two effects in equilibrium. The latter effect
implies that the expected size of the jump in the exchange rate is always at least at large
in an economy with a high value of κ compared to an economy with a low value of κ. The
former effect implies that the probability of the regime switch can be lower in an economy
with a high value of κ than in an economy with a low value of κ. In particular, when the
initial amount of public debt is large the probability of the regime switch is lower in an
economy with a high value of κ than in an economy with a low value of κ.
What do the two effects imply for the simulated data? Figure 5 displays histograms of
data simulated using the model for an economy with a low value of κ and for an economy
with a high value of κ. When the parameter κ increases the regime switch gets delayed,
that is, the mean value of T in the simulated data rises. The reason is that the presence
of foreign currency public debt makes the total amount of public debt grow more slowly.
This implies that more time elapses before public debt reaches the point where the regime
switch is triggered. Furthermore, when the parameter κ increases the size of the jump in
the exchange rate rises, that is, the mean value of PT in the simulated data increases. The
reason is that foreign currency public debt acts as leverage. Figure 6 depicts four examples
of data simulated using the model. Each simulation uses the same shocks. Compare the
economy in which most public debt is denominated in the domestic currency (column 1) to
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the economy in which most public debt is denominated in the foreign currency (column 2).
The economy in column 1 sees a larger expansion of public debt and experiences a currency
crisis earlier compared to the economy in column 2. The model predicts that economies
identical in every respect except for the currency composition of public debt will see different
paths of macroeconomic variables. The reason is that a change in the currency composition
of public debt affects private agents’ expectations regarding the probability and the size of
the jump in the exchange rate. In particular, a currency crisis gets delayed when the share
of foreign currency public debt is large.
Furthermore, issuing foreign currency public debt can act as a substitute for fiscal reform.
Compare the economies depicted in columns 2 and 3 of Figure 6. Both economies experience
a currency crisis at about the same time and later than the economy in column 1. The reason
why the currency crisis is delayed in the economy in column 3 is very different from the
reason why the currency crisis is delayed in the economy in column 2. In the economy in
column 3 there is more fiscal reform when the active monetary passive fiscal regime is in
place, that is, the parameter φ1 is relatively high. In the economy in column 2, a greater
share of public debt is denominated in the foreign currency. It is striking that a change in
the currency composition of public debt can produce as much delay as fiscal reform. Notice
also that the size of a currency crisis, when a currency crisis finally occurs, is largest in the
economy in column 2 in which the government is most leveraged.
The model predicts that a fixed exchange rate in an economy where a sizable fraction
of public debt is denominated in a foreign currency is more likely to survive relatively mild
shocks and afterwards collapse with a bang after a truly bad shock. The model also indicates
that more vigorous fiscal reform when the fixed exchange rate is in place delays the date
of the currency crisis. In the real world fiscal reform is costly whereas the alternative of
borrowing mostly in a foreign currency is costless in the immediate future. If anything, fiscal
accounts “improve” as the total amount of public debt falls. Furthermore, the alternative
of borrowing mostly in a foreign currency is associated with only a possibility of a currency
crisis, perhaps in a distant future. Therefore, the model suggests why policymakers with a
high discount rate can be attracted to borrowing in a foreign currency.
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5.3 Seigniorage revenues
Column 4 in Figure 6 illustrates the effects of changes in the nominal interest rate in the
passive monetary active fiscal regime, R¯. The economy in column 4 has a larger value of
R¯ and therefore the present discounted value of seigniorage revenues is larger than in the
economy in column 3.28 This implies that the economy in column 4 experiences a smaller
jump in the exchange rate, but at the expense of an upward drift in the exchange rate
after the currency crisis. This comparison illustrates the trade-off between the one-time
jump in the exchange rate coincident with the regime switch and the chronic exchange rate
depreciation after the regime switch. Notice also that the economies in columns 1-3 do not
experience an increase in seigniorage revenues after the currency crisis.
5.4 Suddenness of the regime switch
The model suggests that, even when equilibrium is unique, a currency crisis will be sud-
den and difficult to predict. For example, the economy depicted in column 3 in Figure 6
experiences a one-time spike in the nominal interest rate and afterwards a currency crisis
occurs. Furthermore, consider the histograms of the simulated data in Figure 5. Almost
all observations on the probability of the regime switch qt are near zero and, in addition,
some observations are near one. This implies that a currency crisis can be sudden, even if
it is due to fundamentals and is unique equilibrium phenomenon. Furthermore, it can be
difficult to predict a currency crisis more than a single period in advance. A currency crisis
preceded by smoothly rising interest rates or by a prolonged period with high and stable
rates is unlikely to happen. The suddenness is caused by the same dynamic of public debt
that produces multiple solutions for some parameter values. Once the probability of the
regime switch is even a little bit different from zero, interest rates rise swiftly precipitating
the regime switch.
The model also suggests what makes a currency crisis inevitable. Recall from expression
(10) that the fiscal shock ψ is a Gaussian random variable. Since a Gaussian random variable
has unbounded support, a regime switch in the model occurs with probability one in finite
28The variable “seigniorage” plotted in Figure 6 is computed consistent with equation (8) as
³
Rt−1
Rt
´
Mt
Pt
in every period t.
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time. In this sense the active monetary passive fiscal regime is unsustainable and a currency
crisis is inevitable. However, it is possible to solve the model under the specification that
the fiscal shock ψ has bounded support. If in addition the parameter D¯ is a large number,
then there will be no currency crisis for some realizations of the stochastic process for {ψt}.
That policy is expected to switch to the passive monetary active fiscal regime in some states
of nature does not imply per se that a regime switch must occur in equilibrium. This is a
difference between this model and the first generation model of Krugman (1979) and Flood
and Garber (1984) in which policy behavior implies that a currency crisis is inevitable.
6 Concluding observations
The model developed in this paper emphasizes coordination of monetary policy and fiscal
policy and the dynamics of private agents’ expectations in the presence of uncertainty.
Many features that play a central role in the model have played a central role in recent
currency crises. These features include small seigniorage revenues, currency composition of
public liabilities and fiscal reform.
Policy discussions surrounding a currency crisis often emphasize that insufficient fiscal
reform had taken place before a successful speculative attack occurred. This model suggests
that how much fiscal reform takes place after a successful speculative attack is more impor-
tant for stability of a fixed exchange rate, in the sense of ruling out self-fulfilling currency
crises.
The model focuses on a particular form of active monetary policy. However, the insights
from the model apply to other forms of active monetary policy. For example, the model
guides our intuition about a possible crisis scenario in a monetary union. It has been pointed
out that explicit default on public debt seems more costly than restarting a national currency
(Sims, 1999). Furthermore, a formal change of the status quo seems more costly than
creating “something akin to a second currency (...) — not a currency by name, perhaps, but
by function.” (Uhlig, 2002, p. 25). Whether the former or the latter scenario is expected,
this model suggests that the dynamics of a possible crisis will depend on what policy is
expected to do after the monetary union collapses or is suspended.
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The model can be extended in a variety of directions. It will be interesting to endogenize
the policy behavior assumed in the model, for example based on a political economy model.
It will also be interesting to extend the model to include real variables, for example by
introducing firms, production and a financial friction. In addition, it will be interesting to
collect econometric evidence concerning policy regime switches.
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A Numerical solution procedure
The numerical solution procedure is as follows. In any period t such that a regime switch has
not taken place prior to period t the first step is to check, using expression (11) and taking
as given {Bt−1,Mt−1, Ft−1} and ψt, whether a regime switch occurs in period t. Suppose
that a regime switch does not occur, that is, suppose that t satisfies t < T . Then Pt = P¯
and τ t is given by expression (10). Consider equation (22). One substitutes equation (20)
for Et
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢
in equation (22) and one substitutes equation (16) for qt in equation
(22). Observe that, according to equation (16), the probability of the regime switch is given
by qt = Φ
h eψt(Rt)
σ
i
, where Φ denotes the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function
and eψt (Rt) indicates that eψt is a function of Rt. Thus equation (22) becomes a nonlinear
equation in a single variable, Rt. One solves equation (22) and afterwards one solves for
the other variables of the model given Rt. The solution of equation (22) makes use of the
erf function in Matlab. Specifically,
qt =
1
2
(
1 + erf
"eψt (Rt)
σ
√
2
#)
.
Given Rt, equations (7) and (18) yield Mt and Ct, equations (14)-(15) yield Bt and Ft,
equation (20) yields Et
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢
and equation (22) yields qt. This yields
©
Ct, Bt,Mt, Ft, τ t, Rt, Pt, qt, Et
¡
P−1t+1 | switch
¢ª
.
Next, suppose that t satisfies t ≥ T . Then Rt = R¯ and τ t = τ¯ +ψt. Furthermore, equation
(21) determines Pt, equations (7) and (18) determine Mt and Ct given Pt and equations (1)
and (13) determine Bt and Ft given Pt. This yields {Ct, Bt,Mt, Ft, τ t, Rt, Pt}.
B Data sources
Data on federal debt in Brazil, at monthly frequency, are taken from the website of Banco Central
do Brasil, http://www.bcb.gov.br. All other data are taken from Datastream: the monetary base
is the series BRI14...A, foreign reserves are the series BRI11...A, the central bank’s net claims on
treasury are set equal to the series BRI12A..A minus the series BRI16D..A, the exchange rate is the
series BRXRUSD., the money market interest rate is the series BRI60B.., nominal GDP is the series
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BRGDP...A, the interest rate on dollar denominated treasury bills is the series BRI60C.F. All the
series are at monthly frequency except for nominal GDP, which is quarterly. Seigniorage revenues
in a given quarter t are computed, consistent with equation (8), as
³
Rt−1
Rt
´
Mt
GDPt where Rt is the
money market interest rate, Mt is the monetary base and GDPt is nominal GDP.
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Table 1: Currency crises in Korea (1997), Mexico (1994) and Turkey (2001)
Korea Mexico Turkey
Size of devaluation†, in percent 46 41 44
Fiscal imbalance*, in percent of GDP 24 15 18.2
Fiscal gains from seigniorage, in percent of GDP 1.1 1.8 1.7
Fiscal gains from a decrease in the real value of public debt
    and transfer payments, in percent of GDP 12.4 20.1 8.2
Fiscal gains from reform#, in percent of GDP 9.9 -3.7 1.5
†Percentage decrease in the value of the domestic currency relative to the dollar in the quarter after the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate.
*The fiscal cost of the bank bailout in each country.
#The sum of explicit fiscal reform (an increase in the present discounted value of primary budget surpluses due to legislative action)
    and implicit fiscal reform (an increase in the present discounted value of primary budget surpluses due to currency devaluation, without legislative action).
Sources: The first row is based on data from International Financial Statistics. The rest is based on Table 7 in Burnside,
   Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005).
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Figure 1: The currency crisis in Brazil, January 1999 
Note: See Appendix B for data sources. 
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Figure 2: The benchmark economy 
Note: See Section 5 for the parameter values. 
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Figure 3: The effects of changes in the parameter θ1                         
Note: The parameter values are the same as in the benchmark economy except as indicated to the left of each row. 
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Figure 4: The effects of changes in the parameter κ                         
κ = 0.1
            
κ = 0.9
            
Note: Thin lines reproduce the solution for the benchmark economy.                                                          
Thick lines are drawn for the same parameter values as in the benchmark economy except as indicated to the left of each row. 
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 Figure 5: Histograms of data simulated from the model 
Note: The parameter values are the same as in the benchmark economy except as indicated to the left of each row.  
Histograms are based on 250 simulations of the model. T denotes the period in which the regime switch occurs.                                             
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 Figure 6: Examples of time series simulated from the model 
Note: Each simulation uses the same shocks and different parameter values.                          
The parameter values are the same as in the benchmark economy except as indicated above each column.
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